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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE
DEBORAH L. BROOKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 4:08-cv-43
)
KIRBY RISK CORP., )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Kirby Risk Corporation's 
Motion For Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant, Kirby Risk 
Corporation, on April 15, 2009 (DE # 20). For the reasons set
forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk 
is ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's complaint. The 
Clerk is FURTHER ORDERED to close this case.
BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2008, after filing a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and receiving a right- 
to-sue notice, Plaintiff, Deborah Brooks ("Brooks"), sued 
Defendant, Kirby Risk Corporation ("Kirby"), her former employer. 
Brooks alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 ("the ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Indiana Civil 
Rights Act ("the ICRA") , Ind. Code § 22-9-5, et seq., both
resulting from Kirby's alleged discrimination against Brooks on the
basis of a disability.1 On June 16, 2008, Kirby removed the case 
to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 
§1441(b).
Kirby then filed the instant motion for summary judgment on 
the claims, arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Specifically, Kirby asserts that Brooks was not disabled under the 
ADA, nor was she regarded as disabled under the ADA, and, even if 
she was, Kirby is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because 
Kirby made reasonable efforts to accommodate her. On June 15, 
2009, a hearing on Kirby's Motion for Summary Judgment was held in 
Lafayette, Indiana, after which both parties submitted supplemental 
briefs. Having been fully briefed, the motion is now ripe for 
adjudication.
DISCUSSION 
Summary Judgment
The standards that generally govern summary judgment motions 
are familiar. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
1 Claims of disability discrimination brought under the ADA and ICRA are
analyzed in the same manner. See Tracy v. Fin. Ins. Mgmt. Corp., 458 F.
Supp.2d 734, 742 (S.D. Ind. 2006). Accordingly, this order will
heretofore refer solely to the ADA in analyzing whether Brooks is disabled 
under both the federal and state statutes.
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In other words, the record 
must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. 
Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th 
Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
250 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court 
must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Nucor Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas De 
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of 
"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits," if any, that the 
movant believes demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the movant has met 
this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but 
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill 
Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v. 
Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989) . 
"Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law 
underlying a particular claim and ’only disputes over facts that 
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will 
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’" Walter v.
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Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 248).
” [A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue 
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, 
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact which requires trial.” Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 
840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also 
Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg. , 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an 
essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof at 
trial, summary judgment will be appropriate.
Facts
Brooks worked at Kirby's headquarters in Lafayette, Indiana, 
from 1987 until 2007. (Brooks Aff. 5 2, DE # 24-2.) Originally, 
Brooks worked in Kirby's accounting department. (Id.) However, in 
1993, Brooks was transferred to the warehouse, where she was 
responsible for packing orders and preparing them for delivery.
(Brooks Depo. 38:22-39:9, DE # 22-2.)
In 2004, Brooks sustained a back injury while working in the 
warehouse. (Brooks Depo. 65:7-13, DE # 22-2.) As a result, from 
April 28, 2004, to May 14, 2004, Brooks was placed on leave
pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). (Bradley Dec. 
5 5, DE # 22-3.) On May 14, 2004, Brooks returned to work for 4
4
hours a day, but with a 20 pound lifting restriction. (Id. at 5 
6.) On June 7, 2004, Brooks' chiropractor, Dr. Doug Williams, 
released her to work 8 hour days with the 20 pound weight 
restriction remaining in effect through June 21, 2004. (Exhibit E 
to Brooks Depo., DE # 22-2.)
In 2005 and 2006, Kirby downsized its Lafayette branch and 
eliminated Brooks' position in the warehouse. (Gutridge Dec. 5­
6, DE # 22-4.) Brooks then applied for a showroom/delivery 
position, which she was offered in February 2006. (Brooks Depo. 
49:20-50:12, DE # 22-2.) The description of the showroom/delivery 
position identified the "[a]bility to push, pull, lift, and carry 
up to 50 lbs" as an essential function of the job. (Exhibit B to 
Brooks Depo., DE # 22-2.)
In August 2006, Brooks was off of work for approximately 6 
weeks for carpel tunnel surgery. (Bradley Dec. 5 10, DE # 22-3.) 
Although she initially had lifting restrictions as a result of her 
surgery, Brooks' lifting restrictions were removed by October 30, 
2006. (Id.)
In November 2006, Jennifer Swisher, a Kirby branch manager, 
told Brooks that she was being made a route driver. (Brooks Aff. 
5 9, DE # 24-2.) Brooks immediately expressed her belief that, due 
to her 2004 injury, she could not lift enough to be a route driver. 
(Brooks Depo. 86:3-7, DE # 22-2.) Brooks asserts that she was then 
angrily dismissed from Swisher's office. (Brooks Aff. 55 10-11, DE
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# 24-2.) Brooks subsequently provided Swisher with a copy of her 
medical restriction, which stated that she should not do 
"repetitive lifting over 20-25 lbs." (Ex. G to Brooks Depo., DE # 
22-2.)
In her deposition, Brooks confirmed that the physical 
requirements for the delivery position were the same as the 
requirements for the showroom/delivery position she already had. 
(Id. at 86:1-2, 89:22-25.) Nonetheless, she testified that the
lift and carry requirements of the delivery position were beyond 
the restriction that she alleges should have been in place after 
her accident in 2004. (Id. at 78:24-79:4.)
On November 21, 2006, Kirby placed Brooks on FMLA leave. (Id. 
at 89:10-16.) She remained on FMLA leave until March 2007, when 
her FMLA time limit was exhausted, at which point Kirby terminated 
her employment. (Id. at 89:10-16, 90:8-10.) Kirby informed Brooks 
that she was free to contact them in the future if her physical 
restrictions were lifted. (Ex. K to Brooks Depo., DE # 22-2.)
On June 4, 2008, Brooks brought suit against Kirby for 
violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the ICRA, 
Ind. Code § 22-9-5, et seq. Kirby now moves for summary judgment 
on both claims.
The ADA and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The ADA was enacted in 1990 in order to prevent employers from
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discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of a 
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute defined a disability 
as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record 
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)).
Because the 1990 statute failed to define the terms 
'substantially limits' and 'regarded as,' the precise meaning of 
each phrase was left to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Toyota 
Motor Mfg. , Ky. , Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) 
(holding that a disability 'substantially limits' a major life 
activity where it "prevents or severely restricts the individual 
from doing activities that are of central importance to most 
people's daily lives" and has an impact that is "permanent or long 
term."); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) 
(holding that in order to be 'regarded as' having a disability, an 
employer must "believe either that one has a substantially limiting 
impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially 
limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so 
limiting.").
In September 2008, President Bush signed the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), which went into effect on January 1, 2009. 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 29
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U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). Although the ADAAA left unchanged the
definition of 'disability' found in the 1990 Act, the amendments 
conveyed Congress' intent to reject both Toyota's interpretation of 
'substantially limits,' and Sutton's reasoning concerning the 
'regarded as' prong of the Act's definition of a 'disability.' Id. 
at sec. 2(b)(3)-(4). In doing so, Congress dramatically expanded 
the reach of the ADA by protecting individuals who are 'regarded 
as' having a disabling impairment even when the impairment neither 
is, nor is perceived to be, substantially limiting. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(3) (A) ("An individual meets the requirement of 'being 
regarded as having such an impairment' if the individual 
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits 
or is perceived to limit a major life activity.").
The Effect of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 on Brooks' claim
In their supplemental brief, Kirby argues that the ADAAA does 
not apply retroactively, and, therefore, Brooks' claim must be 
evaluated under the ADA as it existed when the alleged violations 
took place. (DE # 29 at 1-3.) Brooks does not dispute Kirby's 
argument that the ADAAA has no retroactive application; however, 
she argues that the amendments clarify Congressional intent with 
regard to the 1990 statue. (DE # 30 at 3.)
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The Seventh Circuit, along with the Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, have each held that the ADA Amendments 
are not retroactive. See Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 600 
n.1 (7th Cir. 2009); Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc., 295 Fed. 
Appx. 850, 851 (7th Cir. 2008).2 Noting that there is no dispute 
between the parties on this point, this Court likewise concludes 
that the amendments are not retroactive and that Brooks' claims 
must be analyzed under the ADA of 1990.
Brooks' argument that Congressional intent expressed in the 
ADAAA should influence this Court's interpretation of the 1990 law 
was recently recognized by the Ninth Circuit, which held that, "the 
ADAAA sheds light on Congress' original intent when it enacted the 
ADA." Rohr, 555 F.3d at 861; see also Yount v. Regent Univ., Inc., 
No. CV-08-8011-PCT-DGC, 2009 WL 995596, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 
2009) ("this Circuit recognizes that the ADAAA may be relevant to 
the scope of terms within the ADA."). To the extent, however, that 
the Ninth Circuit opined that the ADAAA should influence a court's 
reading of the 1990 ADA, Rohr is inconsistent with Seventh Circuit 
precedent instructing courts to use not only the laws but also the
2 See also E.E.O.C. v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that the amendments do not apply retroactively); Milholland 
v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Lytes 
v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 2009 WL 2152427 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 
21, 2009) (same). But see Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement 
and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide 
whether the amendments apply retroactively); Durham v. McDonald's Rest. of 
Okla., Inc., 2009 WL 1132362 (10th Cir. Apr. 28, 2009) (same); Shannon v. 
Potter, 2009 WL 1598442 (11th Cir. June 9, 2009) (same).
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"interpretations that were in force when the complained-of-acts 
occurred." Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc., 295 Fed. Appx. 850, 851 
(7th Cir. 2008).
The Western District of Wisconsin recently rejected an 
argument similar to Brooks', citing the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 280 
(1994), and holding that there is a presumption against statutes 
having a retroactive effect, in order to avoid "increas[ing] 
defendant's liability for past conduct." Ekstrand v. School Dist. 
of Somerset, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1205 (W.D. Wis. 2009).
Using Congress' stated purpose for enacting the ADAAA to 
interpret the ADA as it existed in 2007 could potentially increase 
Kirby's liability for past conduct. Absent explicit Congressional 
intent to do so, Brooks' claim must be analyzed using both the 
statute and the interpretation thereof that existed in 2007 (when 
the alleged violations occurred).
That interpretation includes the two cases that were expressly 
overturned by the ADAAA: Toyota, 534 U.S. 184, and Sutton, 527 
U.S. 471. Due to the Court's recognition of complete judicial 
retroactivity, had the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, 
overturned Toyota and Sutton, they would not properly apply to this 
case. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 
(1993) ("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the 
parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of
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federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases 
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the 
rule."). However, when Congress overturns judicial precedent, the 
usual rules of legislative retroactivity apply.
An example of this can be seen in the recent case AT&T Corp. 
v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009), dealing with the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"). In 1978, Congress passed the 
PDA, which mandated that it was discriminatory to treat pregnancy- 
related conditions less favorably than other conditions. 92 Stat. 
2076, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). By prohibiting sex discrimination on 
the basis of pregnancy, the PDA superceded General Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), a prior Supreme Court case that had 
permitted wage discrimination based on pregnancy. In 2009, in 
AT&T, the Supreme Court held that the PDA was not retroactive and 
sought to determine whether AT&T was liable for conduct predating 
the enactment of the PDA. The Court expressly cited reasoning from 
Gilbert, though that case had long since been overturned by 
Congress, because it set forth the state of the law at the time of 
the alleged violation. AT&T, 129 S. Ct. at 1969-70.
Here too, this Court must use Toyota, Sutton, and their 
progeny in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and District 
Courts, in order to determine whether Brooks' claims regarding 
Kirby's alleged violation of the 1990 ADA can survive summary
11
judgment.
Brooks' Alleged Disability Under the 1990 ADA
A plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment on an ADA claim 
"must demonstrate that there is at least a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether [s]he is disabled, whether [s]he can 
perform the essential functions of the position, and whether [s]he 
has suffered an adverse employment action because of his [or her] 
disability." Kupstas v. City of Greenwood, 398 F.3d 609, 611 (7th 
Cir. 2005).
Turning first to the issue of whether Brooks is considered 
'disabled' under the 1990 ADA, she must show that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether she possessed any of 
the following: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Brooks has not 
attempted to state a claim under subsection (A) . She instead 
alleges that she has stated a claim under subsection (C) because 
Kirby regarded her as having a disability.
Regardless of what subsection Brooks is proceeding under, 
"concepts of 'substantially limits' and 'major life activity' are 
the same whether the employee is proceeding under a claim that she
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is actually disabled or regarded as disabled." Mack v. Great Dane
Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, in 
order for Brooks to prevail under subsection (C), Kirby must have 
believed that Brooks had a disability that substantially limited 
her in a major life activity. Id. at 782 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. 
at 489; EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 796-97 
(9th Cir. 2002); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 
913 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Brooks argues that Kirby regarded her as having a disability 
that substantially limited her in the major life activity of 
working. E.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 (in which the Court assumed 
without deciding that working is a major life activity under the 
ADA) . Kirby, however, argues that a twenty-five pound lifting 
restriction does not substantially limit any major life activities 
and, since that restriction is the only one Kirby believed Brooks 
to be under, it did not regard her as being disabled under the ADA.
Indeed, relevant Seventh Circuit authority supports Kirby's 
conclusion. See Squibb v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that a nurse who was unable to lift more than 
ten pounds per day was not substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working); Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869-70 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (expressing doubt that the inability to lift more than 
10 pounds constitutes a disability under the ADA); Contreras v. 
Suncast Corp., 237 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that an
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individual who was "unable to lift in excess of 45 pounds for a 
long period of time," and "unable to engage in strenuous work" was 
not substantially limited in the major life activity of working).
In contrast, a restriction substantially limits the major life 
activity of working where an employee shows that he or she is 
restricted from a "broad class of jobs" based on "the breadth of 
the restrictions placed on plaintiffs and their doctors' 
recommendations concerning how their respective injuries would 
affect their ability to obtain other employment." Contreras, 237 
F.3d at 763 n.5; see also DePaoli v. Abbott Lab., 140 F.3d 668, 673 
(7th Cir. 1998) (in which plaintiff raised a triable issue of 
whether her restriction substantially limited the major life 
activity of working by producing medical evidence opining that she 
could not perform any employment requiring repetitive hand 
motions).
Here, Brooks alleges that Kirby perceived her as unable to 
perform any job within the company that had a lifting restriction. 
Yet Brooks' inability to work specific jobs at Kirby is not 
necessarily indicative of her inability to obtain similar 
employment at other warehouses or with other companies. See 
Contreras, 237 F.3d at 763 n.5. In fact, Brooks has failed to 
present any evidence that her restriction, or perceived 
restriction, would preclude her from performing a broad class of 
jobs or obtaining other similar employment. As such, Brooks has
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failed to raise a triable issue that her inability to lift 25 
pounds and/or Kirby's perception thereof, renders her disabled 
under the 1990 ADA.3
Because Brooks has failed to raise a triable issue of fact 
regarding her alleged disability under the ADA, this Court need not 
consider any subsequent issues, including those raised in 
supplemental briefing.4 (DE ## 29-30.)
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Brooks was not disabled under the 1990 
ADA. Because Brooks has failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact, Kirby Risk Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(DE # 21) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to dismiss with 
prejudice Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant. The Clerk is 
FURTHER ORDERED to close this case.
3 As previously noted, the analysis of whether Brooks is disabled under the 
ADA is the same under the ICRA, which defines a disability as "(1) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits at least one (1) 
of the major life activities of the individual; (2) a record of an 
impairment described in subdivision (1); or (3) being regarded as having 
an impairment described in subdivision (1). Ind. Code § 22-9-5-6. Having 
determined that Kirby did not regard Brooks as having a disability under 
the ADA, the same is true under the IRCA. Therefore, Kirby is entitled to 
summary judgment on Brooks' IRCA claim as well as her ADA claim.
4 The parties submitted supplemental briefs following the June 15, 2009,
hearing in which they discussed the existing circuit split on whether the 
ADA requires employers to accommodate employees with perceived
disabilities. Here, since Kirby did not regard Brooks as having a
disability under the ADA, this Court need not determine whether Kirby was 
required to afford her accommodations.
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DATED: September 21, 2009 /s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge 
United States District Court
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